Abstract
Raising an ontological question regarding meaning of ''a being'' and also the meaning of an ''intelligent being'', Heidegger identifies intentionality with the skillful coping of a social, norm bound, engaged and context dependent embodied being. This he describes in terms of a being ''in-the-world'' Dasein's tool using activity, which is determined by social practices and norms. Unlike Husserl's, intentionality in Heidegger is primarily semantic, the necessary conditions of skillful coping are also the necessary conditions of intentional acts. The entire question of computers attaining Dasein like character is largely dependent on whether these purposeful causal laws can also be formalized. While Dreyfus rules out this possibility, Mark Okrent successfully argues that there is nothing in Heidegger which rules out the possibility of computers attaining a Dasein like character. I believe this sufficiently supports my thesis of this article that there is stronger reasons in Heidegger than in Husserl for rejecting the claim that some entities which act like computers can not also be probable candidates for acing intelligently as a thinking being is supposed to do.